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Abstract 
This paper describes one proposition about dynamic Markowitz portfolio selection in an open 
economy. Here it is proved that, assuming that two countries in an open economy share the 
same risk absolute aversion coefficient and the same information set with some conditions, 
the portfolio each country holds always attains the same rate of return, regardless of the 
characteristics of each country’s risky asset market, of the proportion in each country’s 
personal asset holdings, of the characteristics of the exchange rate price process, or of the 
risk free rate in each country. One basic implication of this proposition is that, when two 
countries share the common information set, each country might be, under these 
non-general conditions, indifferent, regarding the allocation of home/foreign risky assets, to 
the diffusion of exchange rate price process. Finally, I discuss another implication of this 
proposition in the relation with international portfolio diversification and so called “the 
home bias puzzle”. 
 
1. Model and proposition 
Organization of an open economy 
We assume an open economy with two countries, two distinct risk-free assets, and 
two distinct, risky assets, one of which represents respectively one of two countries. Each 
risk-free asset is regarded as each country 's own currency, and is also exchangeable with 
each other. (So, needless to say, each country may hold the other country's assets.) Figure 1 
shows the organization of this economic system. Assume the discrete time flow, t=0,1,2,…. 
Also, we denote each country, a representative economic agent, by k=1,2. In addition, the 
proportion of each country in its personal asset holdings as of time t (Ak,t), being p  for 
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country 1 and p-1  for country 2.1  
 
Price processes 
In country 1 there exist one risk-free asset, denoted by fa, and one risky asset, rb, 
while in country 2 one risk-free asset, fc, and one risky asset, rd, do. Defining the allocation 
of each asset (fa, rb, fc, rd) for country k (k=1,2) respectively as takz ,, , tbkz ,, , tckz ,,  and 
tdkz ,, , then the price process of each asset (fa, rb, fc, rd) as of time t are assumed to be 
represented as following:2 3 
D ln Sa,t = raDt  
})1({ln ,,2,,1,1,, tbtbbtbbbTtbbtb zpzpBgtS D×-+D××+D++D=D - hsgn   
 trS ctc D=D ,ln   
})1({ln ,,2,,1,1,, tdtddtdddTtddtd zpzpBgtS D×-+D××+D++D=D - hsgn  (1.1) 
Here, bh  and dh  are the demand elasticities of the market prices, Ttbg 1, -  and Ttdg 1, -  
are the row vectors containing complete information sets regarding the price processes, 
tbB ,D  and tdB ,D are the standard Brownian motions, bn  and dn  are the drifts, bs  and 
ds  are the diffusions, for risky asset rb and rd, respectively. Let D ln Sex ,t{ }t® ¥  denote the 
exchange rate price process of the risk-free asset in country 1 (fa) to the risk-free asset in 
country 2 (fc). Then,  
                                                   
1 As seen later, the self-financing and utility maximizing portfolio selection strategy keeps the asset 
proportion of each country ( p ) automatically constant under some general assumptions of the 
proposition. 
2 1,,,,,,,, =+++ tdktcktbktak zzzz （for k=1,2 and for all t.）. 
3 The notation, D , represents the difference of time t+1 from time t. 
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]}[)1(][{ln ,,2,,2,,1,,1,, tbtatdtcextexexextex zzpzzpBtS D+D×-+D+D×-+D+D=D hsn (1.2) 4 
 
Estimation and forecast 
Assume that the price process of a risky asset (denoted by r=rb, rd, say), 
D ln Sr, t{ }t ® ¥  is already revealed until time t-1. Then define its past history and the 
explanatory variable (information set) matrix as following.  
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        (1.3) 
Here, Te (t-1, t-2,…, t- Te) denotes the past periods on which the estimate is based, and 1-tX  
is a common explanatory variable matrix for each country, k=1,2. The first column vector of 
1-tX  is a summer vector, all elements of which are 1’s. For one example, the first row vector 
of 1-tX , [ ]1,1,11 ,, --- º tJtTt xxx  , contains 1, Ttbg 1, - , Ttdg 1, - , tbzp ,,1D× , tczp ,,1D× , 
tdzp ,,1D× , tazp ,,2)1( D×- , tbzp ,,2)1( D×-  and tdzp ,,2)1( D×- . We also define the above 
matrix and apply them to the following Neoclassical Regression Model. 
),(~ 211 IXNy trtt sb--        (1.4) 
where Xt is non-stochastic and rank(Xt-1)=J, and I is an identity matrix.  
                                                   
4 The no-arbitrage condition imposes an additional restriction, )( acex rr --=n . 
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We assume that each country, k=1,2, believes that this model applies. However, it does not 
have to be true. Then, defining Qt -1 º X t -1T Xt -1 , At -1 º Qt-1-1Xt -1T , Nt -1 º Xt -1At -1 , 
Mt -1 º I - Nt -1  and et-1 º Mt-1yt -1 , the estimated value of the variance of return ( 2ˆ ts ) 
can be represented as follows. 
JT
ee
e
t
T
t
t -=
-- 112sˆ        (1.5) 
The forecast value of the expected rate of return as of time t ( ˆ n t ) can be represented as 
follows. 
11
1
1ˆ ----= tTttTtt yXQxn        (1.6) 
where [ ]tJtTt xxx ,,1 ,,º  is the first row vector of the explanatory variable 
matrix, tX . 
 
Expected utility 
Each country's expected utility function at time t-1 is a function of the rate of return 
(ΔlnAk,t), and takes the following form.  
))]ln1(exp([ ,11 tkkttkt AEuE D+--= -- a      (1.7) 
where Ak,t is the total asset value of the country k(=1,2) at time t, and ktktk uu a=- '/" .  
This utility function possesses a constant coefficient of absolute risk aversion (ak), and is 
upwardly concave over Ak,t's entire domain (including where Ak,t is negative). Each country 
holds a portfolio consisting of a risk-free asset and risky assets. The future expected rate of 
return and variance for each risky asset are estimated based on the past history of 
explanatory variables, and the portfolio allocation, overall expected rate of return, and 
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overall variance and determined so as to maximize expected utility for the following period. 
For example, consider the case in which a country has to determine the allocation ( tz ) of 
risky assets (r, say) for the next time t (and hence the allocation ( tz-1 ) of the risk-free asset 
(f, say)) as follows.  
)))ln1(exp((maxarg 1 ttt AEz D+--= - a      (1.8) 
Since the (excess) rate of return follows a normal distribution, and we denote the allocation 
of the risky asset by tz  and therefore that of a risk-free asset by tz-1 , then the allocation 
zt , which maximizes the expected utility for the next time (t), is calculated, as a well-known 
result, in the following formula.    
 2ˆ
ˆ
t
ft
t
rz sa
n
×
-=         (1.9) 
where α is an absolute risk aversion coefficient. 
 
Now we claim the following proposition. 
Proposition . Assume that the absolute risk aversion coefficients are the same in both 
countries (α1=α2). Then, the allocation of risky assets (rb in country 1 and rd in country 2) 
are always the same for both countries for all t. That is: 
 tbtb zz ,,2,,1 = , tdtd zz ,,2,,1 =  for all t 
In addition, the rates of return in the personal asset holdings are always the same for both 
countries for all t. 
D ln A1, t = D ln A2,t   for all t 
 
Note that these relationships should hold regardless of the values of ar , cr ,nb ,n d , 
nex ,sb ,sd ,sex ,hb ,hd ,hex , bg , dg or p . The proof is shown in Section 3. 
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2.  Method for allocating assets in an open economy 
Asset allocation for country 1 
For Country 1, three assets (rb, fc, rd) are risky assets.  
úú
úú
ú
û
ù
êê
êê
ê
ë
é
D
D
D
º
-
-
-
-
eTtb
tb
tb
tb
S
S
S
y
,
2,
1,
1,,1
ln
ln
ln
  
úú
úú
ú
û
ù
êê
êê
ê
ë
é
D+
D+
D+
º
-
-
-
-
eTtexc
texc
texc
tc
Sr
Sr
Sr
y
,
2,
1,
1,,1
ln
ln
ln
  
úú
úú
ú
û
ù
êê
êê
ê
ë
é
D+D
D+D
D+D
º
--
--
--
-
ee TtexTtd
textd
textd
td
SS
SS
SS
y
,,
2,2,
1,1,
1,,1
lnln
lnln
lnln
      (2.1) 
Defining the above matrix, y1,b ,t -1 , y1,c,t -1 , y1,d ,t -1  are respectively the histories of the rates 
of return of three assets (rb, fc, rd) which are observed from country 1. 
The expected rate and the variance of return at time t can be estimated as follows. Defining, 
as in Section 1, Qt -1 º X t -1T Xt -1 , At -1 º Qt-1-1Xt -1T , Nt -1 º Xt -1At -1 , Mt -1 º I - Nt -1 , 
e1,b ,t-1 º Mt -1y1,b ,t -1 , e1,c, t-1 º Mt -1y1,c,t -1  and e1,d ,t-1 º Mt -1 y1, d ,t -1 , then the variance and 
the covariance of return at time t can be estimated as:  
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The expected excess rate of return at time t can be forecast as: 
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where 
eT1 is Te *1 summer column vector, all elements of which are 1’s. 
The estimated vector and the estimated covariance matrix of the excess return can be 
constructed as following. 
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Then the allocation vector of a tangency portfolio which consists of three assets (rb, fc, rd) is 
to be defined as: 
 )1/()( ,11,13,11,1tan,,1 ttTttt rVrVw --=      (2.5) 
where 31  is 3*1 summer column vector, all elements of which are 1’s. 
The estimated value of the expected excess return of this tangency portfolio is calculated as: 
)1/()(ˆ ,11,13,11,1,1tan,,1 ttTttTtt rVrVrr --=      (2.6) 
The estimated value of the variance of the excess return of this tangency portfolio is also 
calculated as: 
 2,11,13,11,1,12tan,,1 )1/()(ˆ ttTttTtt rVrVr --=s     (2.7)5 
We also assume that the excess return of this tangency portfolio follows a normal 
distribution, and denote the allocation by z1,tan,t  and therefore that of a risk-free asset (fa) 
by 1 - z1,tan,t . Then the allocation z1,tan,t , which maximizes the expected utility for the next 
                                                   
5 (2.5), (2.6) and (2.7) are also given by, for example, Constantinides et al. (1995). 
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time (t), is calculated as following.   
 z1,tan,t =
ˆ r 1, tan,t
a1 × ˆ s 1, tan,t 2        (2.8)  
where α1 is a absolute risk aversion coefficient for country 1. 
Let w1,tan,t(h)  denote the h th element of the allocation vector w1,tan,t  (3*1 column vector). 
Then, 
 z1,a ,t =1 - z1,tan,t  
 z1,b,t = z1,tan,t * w1,tan,t(2)  
 z1,c ,t = z1, tan,t * w1, tan,t (1)  
 z1,d ,t = z1, tan,t * w1,tan,t (3)       (2.9) 
 
Asset allocation for country 2 
For country 2, three assets (fa, rb, rd) are risky assets. 
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Here, y2,a,t -1 , y2,c, t -1 , y2,d,t -1  are respectively the histories of the rates of return of three 
assets (fa, rb, rd) which are observed from country 2. Then, the remaining calculation is 
quite similar as in country 1. Finally, we get: 
z2,a,t = z2,tan, t * w2, tan,t (1)  
z2,b ,t = z2,tan,t * w2,tan,t (2)  
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z2,c ,t = 1- z2, tan,t  
z2,d , t = z2, tan,t * w2, tan,t(3)       (2.11) 
 
3.  Proof of the proposition 
In this section, we prove the proposition described in Section 1. The condition we 
use is just a1 = a2 º a . (3.1) The histories of the excess rates of return of three “risky” 
assets (rb, fc, rd) are observed from country 1 as follows.  
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where 
eT1  is a Te*1 summer column vector all elements of which are 1’s, and 
ac rrd -º . 
For simplicity, define the following vectors. 
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Furthermore, define R1  as: 
 [ ] [ ]DRRRDRrrrR exdbextdtbtc +++=º --- 1,,11,,11..11    (3.4) 
where R1  is a Te*3 matrix. 
Then, from the definition in Section 3, we have: 
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Here Mt -1 is an idempotent matrix. For simplicity, we replace Mt-1 with M , defining 
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The first, second and third element of the vector z1,tan, t * w1,tan,t  respectively represent the 
allocation of each asset (fc, rb, rd). Next, we calculate )(1 ,11,1
1
tt rV -a . For simplicity, we 
replaceV1.t  with V1, defining tVV ,11 º . 
Defining [ ]dbex RRRR º0  (3.7), 
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Here we used the equality, dZD = , for any arbitrary Ttx  and 1-tX . 
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Here TT ZRVS 0101 -º a  is a 3*1 column vector, and 
1
0
-º VdW a  is a 3*3 symmetric 
matrix. 
Similarly, the histories of the excess rates of return of three “risky” assets (fa, rb, rd) are 
observed from country 2 as follows.  
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Therefore, defining [ ] [ ]dexbextdtbta RDRRDRrrrR ----=º --- 1,,21,,21..22  (3.14) 
( R1  is a Te*3 matrix）, 
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we have 
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Summarizing all the above results, the allocation of all four assets (fa, rb, fc, rd) for country 
1 is calculated as follows. 
tatta zwwsszz ,,2211121tan,,1,,1 1)()(11 +=+-+-=-=  
tbtttb zwswzz ,,2212tan,,1tan,,1,,1 )2(* =+==  
1)()1(* ,,2311131tan,,1tan,,1,,1 -=-+-== tctttc zwwsswzz  
tdtttd zwswzz ,,2313tan,,1tan,,1,,1 )3(* =+==     (3.18) 
Similarly, the allocation of all four assets (fa, rb, fc, rd) for country 2 is calculated as follows. 
1)()()1(* ,,1211121tan,,2tan,,2,,2 -=+-+-== tattta zwwsswzz  
tbtttb zwswzz ,,1212tan,,2tan,,2,,2 )2(* =+==  
tcttc zwwsszz ,,1311131tan,,2,,2 1)()(11 +=-+-+=-=  
tdtttd zwswzz ,,1313tan,,2tan,,2,,2 )3(* =+==     (3.19) 
Using these results, we prove tt AA ,2,1 lnln D=D . We have: 
)lnln()lnln(lnlnln ,,1,,1,,1,,1,1,,1,1,,1,1 textdtdtextctctbtbtatat SSzSSzSzSzA D+D+D+D+D+D=D ++++
tdtdtctctextbtbtextatat SzSzSSzSSzA ,1,,2,1,,2,,1,,2,,1,,2,2 lnln)lnln()lnln(ln D+D+D-D+D-D=D ++++
         (3.20) 
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Plugging (3.18) and (3.19) into (3.20), now the proof is done. 
 
4. Some debates- Home bias puzzle in an open economy 
The proposition presented in this paper has an interesting economic implication in 
the sense that it always holds, (1) regardless of the characteristics of each country’s risky 
asset market, including the demand elasticity of market prices, and (2) regardless of the 
value of the proportion in each country’s personal asset holdings (p for country 1 and 1-p for 
country 2), and (3) regardless of the characteristics of the exchange rate price process (so, 
whether each country’s riskless asset, represented mainly by its currency, is devaluating or 
revaluating against the other country’s), and (4) regardless of the risk free rate in each 
country (that is, ra = rc º r  is not required.), which is supposed to be fixed as a result of 
each country’s monetary policy. Instead, we just need that each country shares the same risk 
aversion coefficient ( a1 = a2 º a ), and the same explanatory variables (the same 
information set), 1-tX .6  
This proposition is not a result which can be necessarily derived from conventional 
general/partial equilibrium theories, but that obtained from a formal coincidence in 
mathematical formulation combined between the risk-minimizing (risky) portfolio selection 
and the utility maximizing allocation of risky/riskfree assets under the CARA utility and 
normality assumptions, as shown in equation ((2.8) and) (3.6). For example, ((2.8) and) (3.6) 
easily breaks, if we abandon the CARA utility or the normality assumption, therefore, in 
these cases, the proposition does not hold. Instead, it always holds regardless of the market 
formation in each country (for example, perfectly/imperfectly competitive, or etc). Also, it 
always holds even if the underlying economic system is not in equilibrium, because we do 
                                                   
6 Of course, the assumption of this proposition, which implicitly takes account of cross sectional 
dependences among panel units, is only a possibility among many. 
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not assume any market clearing condition here, and in addition, because no-arbitrage 
condition in the exchange rate process between two countries, )( acex rr --=n as in (1.2), is 
not needed at all, and all of these aspects show that this proposition is not a derivative result 
from general/partial equilibrium theories, but one peculiar mathematical aspect derived 
from a peculiar matching in formulation within an open economy framework. For example, 
the allocation for riskfree assets in each country may not be, in general, the same for any 
period. ( tata zz ,,2,,1 ¹  and tctc zz ,,2,,1 ¹ , while tctatcta zzzz ,,2,,2,,1,,1 +=+ .) 
Now consider the simplest case where two countries are in symmetry. For example, 
assume ca rr = , db nn = , db ss = , db hh = , 0=exn , 5.0=p . Also, tbB ,D , tdB ,D and 
texB ,D  do not have to be independent with each other, but the correlations need to be 
symmetric between two countries.7 Then, from symmetry in the economic system together 
with (3.18) and (3.19), each country is supposed to hold the same portion of two risky assets 
(rb and rd) in an ergodic sense, that is:8 9 
  rdbdb zzzzz º=== ,2,2,1,1       (4.1) 
 where the upper bar denotes the mean over t .  
Also, from (4.1) and (3.18/19), we have for country 1:  
)( ,1,1,1 rbcd zzzz ==-= , frba zzzz º-=-= )1(1 ,1,1    (4.2) 
where 1=+ fr zz  
(4.1) and (4.2) are equivalent, using the elements of matrix S , with:10 
                                                   
7 Also, assume that the information sets, Ttbg 1, -  and Ttdg 1, -  are generated from symmetric nature 
(the same functional form of stochastic distribution or etc.). 
8 In general, tdtb zz ,,1,,1 ¹ , tdtb zz ,,2,,2 ¹ . 
9 The symmetry assumption requires, db zz ,2,1 = , ac zz ,2,1 =  and bd zz ,2,1 = . 
10 Since ca rr =  )0( =d , all the elements of W  are zeros. 
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 01 =s  and 32 ss =        (4.3) 
 where the upper bar denotes the mean over t .  
 This is somewhat counter intuitive, because, for example for country 1, clearly 
country 2’s risky asset (rd) is more “risky” than its own risky asset (rb) because of the 
exchange rate volatility. But we easily see, in the first equation of (4.2), that all the part of 
volatility in foreign risky asset rd, attributed to exchange rate process, is completely hedged 
by holding the same amount of liability in foreign riskfree asset fc.11 12 Therefore, each 
symmetric country is, in the long run (in an ergodic sense), perfectly neutral against the 
exchange rate volatility ( exs ). The allocation of home/foreign risky assets (rb and rd) itself is 
not only equated between them, as shown in (4.1), but also each country does really respond 
to the increase in the volatility of exchange rate process rather by keeping the total portion 
of home/foreign riskfree assets ( )( ,2,2,1,1 caca zzzz +=+ ) constant. Also, the long-run mean 
proportion of risky asset in domestic financial markets ( bbab zzzz ,1,1,1,1 )/( =+ ) does not 
change either with the larger volatility of exchange rate ( exs ). One basic implication of this 
proposition under this symmetry assumption is that, when two countries share the common 
information set, each country might be, under some non-general conditions, indifferent, 
between its home/foreign risky asset holdings (rb and rd), to the diffusion (volatility) of 
exchange rate price process, which is completely hedged by balancing the debt/holding of 
foreign riskfree/risky assets (fc and rd), so that each country always equates the allocation 
for each risky asset (rb and rd). This aspect strongly supports each country’s considerable 
                                                   
11 This is also counter intuitive and is not rigorously true for each respective period t , because the 
information set 1-tX  is just stochastically generated. It holds only in an ergodic sense. 
12 As a matter of fact, the country can attain the same return (but the larger volatility, therefore the 
smaller utility gain) in a closed economy framework, dealing with only domestic assets fa and rb 
where: 
 12',1 -= fa zz , rb zz 2',1 =   
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gain from international portfolio diversification, as emphasized in Grauer and Hakansson 
(1987). On the other hand, under asymmetry assumption, for example where 
)( acex rr --¹n , in general (4.1) and (4.2) do not hold, so that cd zz ,1,1 -¹ .13 This inequality 
implies that the exchange rate volatility is not completely, but only partially canceled off, 
therefore the larger exs  surely causes the increase in home riskfree asset fa, while the sign 
of change in home risky asset rb is still uncertain. Even in this (asymmetry) case, each 
country is still indifferent to the exchange rate volatility in the sense that both countries 
hold the same share in risky asset rb and rd respectively, as shown in (3.18/19). In other 
words, the existence of exchange rate volatility does not actually make each country 
discriminate regarding the relative allocation in home/foreign risky assets (rb and rd).     
 Finally, within the framework of this model, I state some points, apart from some 
important explanations including “non-traded goods or small utility gains to diversification”, 
in the relation with so called “the home bias puzzle”, which is known as “the contradiction 
between the obvious benefits of holding a globally dispersed set of equities and the apparent 
reluctance to do so” (Obstfelt and Rogoff. (1996), Tesar and Werner (1995)). Also, Coakely, 
Fuertes and Smith (2006) and Drine and Rault (2007) are the examples in both econometric 
(panel data) and computational analysis of international finance including PPP puzzle.  
 
1. Missing information and mis-specified model  
As easily imagined, in case that, for example, one country does not hold some 
information attributed to the other country (for example, Ttdg 1, - , tcz ,,2D  and tdz ,,2D  for 
country 1), the regression model is made under mis-specification, which necessarily causes a 
                                                   
13 )( acex rr --¹n  implies that the exchange rate process is in disequilibrium and does not meet 
no-arbitrage condition. 
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larger estimated variance and smaller allocation of foreign assets (fc and rd for country 1).14 
This, the most plausibly, explains the home bias puzzle, but I exclude it from my focus, since 
it is not a novel illustration. Also, it is noteworthy that even under misspecification, if two 
countries share the same information set 1-tX , then still the proposition holds and the 
home bias should disappear. 
2. Borrowing constraints 
Again, consider country 1 asset holdings in the symmetric case. Then in (4.2), the 
allocation of foreign riskfree asset (fc) is just negative of that of foreign risky asset (rd), and 
the total portion for foreign assets is just zero )0( ,1,1 =+ cd zz . The key point is that, in order 
to be risk neutral against exchange rate volatility and fully to enjoy the utility gain from 
international portfolio diversification, the investors must borrow the same amount of foreign 
riskfree asset as the foreign risky asset holding. If this violates the borrowing constraint, 
which the authority might impose for foreign investors, then necessarily we have bd zz ,1,1 < , 
which is also one persuasive illustration of the home bias puzzle.15  
3. CRRA (constant relative risk aversion) utility 
4. Non-normality of disturbance terms 
Another possibility is that the above two points might also explain the home bias 
puzzle, that is, too excessive, empirically observed emphasis on the risky asset in home 
country. Under a constant relative risk aversion (decreasing in CARA) or an upwardly 
                                                   
14 Also, the missing information about demand/supply gap of each assets ( tbz ,,1D , tcz ,,1D , tdz ,,1D , 
taz ,,2D , tbz ,,2D  and tdz ,,2D ) induces the estimated residual of each price process to be correlated 
over time t . 
15 For foreign investors, as is country 1 investor in country 2, the borrowing constraint might be 
naturally 0,,1 ³tdz , 0,,1 ³tcz , while for domestic investors, as is country 2 investor in country 2, it 
might be, more loosely, 0,,2,,2 ³+ tctd zz . The condition 0,1,1 =+ cd zz  does not actually wipe out 
the high possibility of default in next period, that is 01,,11,,1 <+ ++ tctd zz . 
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deviated asymmetric distribution of disturbance terms, a smaller risk premium and a larger 
incentive for holding home country risky asset might be induced for each country than under 
CARA or a symmetric normal distribution.16 In other words, in these circumstances the 
common information sharing might not ensure that the diffusion of exchange rate can be 
perfectly hedged by adjusting the total amount of home/foreign riskfree assets. One 
hypothesis, for example, is: under CRRA or upwardly tailed disturbance, the foreign risky 
asset holding is not neutral regarding the drift of exchange rate processnex , and the home 
country asset holding is not neutral regarding the diffusion of exchange rate processsex . 
Therefore, it might be worth doing simulation, which cannot be replaced with analytical 
work, under a careful specification of the parameter values and nonparametric estimation of 
distributions and, to examine this hypothesis within the framework of the model. 
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